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Explaining Arbitration Law, forthcoming in Defining Issues in International Arbitration: 
Celebrating 100 Years of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators: Centennial Liber Amicorum 2015)  
Chapter 1 
EXPLAINING ARBITRATION LAW 
  William W. Park ∗ 
A. Introduction 
 
(a) A framework for avoiding courts 
1.01 Most fields of law provide guidance on how courts decide cases.  In contrast, arbitration 
law tells judges when not to decide disputes, in deference to private decision-makers 
selected by the litigants.  Agreements to avoid courts implicate an intricate interaction of 
treaties, statutes and cases, which layer themselves like a Russian nested doll, with one 
carved figure opening to more diminutive figurines. Unlike a matryoshka, however, 
arbitration law often reveals exceptions as capacious as the rule from which they derogate.1 
(b) Regretted decisions 
1.02 People can change their minds, or differ in understanding what was agreed. If one side 
regrets a decision to arbitrate, or the parties diverge about what the arbitration clause 
covers, courts may be asked to assist in implementing the arbitration agreement or 
resulting award.  
1.03 At such moments, arbitration law normally includes two limbs: first, to hold parties to their 
bargains to arbitrate; second, to monitor the basic integrity of the arbitral process, so the 
case will be heard by a fair tribunal that listens before deciding, stays within its mission, 
                                                          
∗ Adapted from The Role of Law in Arbitration, forthcoming 2016 with OUP.  Copyright © 2015 William 
W. Park.    
1 In a similar metaphor from the epic novel Moby Dick, the narrator explains his mental detours: ‘Out of 
the trunk, the branches grow; out of them, the twigs.  So in productive subjects grow the chapters’. Herman 
Melville, ‘The Crotch’ in Moby Dick (1851) ch 63, examining the organisation of whaling boats. 
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and respects the limits of relevant public policy. As we shall see, in applying these 
principles, the devil lurks in the details of each award, ruling or contract.2   
1.04 Arbitration can exist without law, of course. Arbitration involves a dispute resolution 
process intended as binding by the parties themselves. Nothing stops merchants from 
making a deal to arbitrate even absent a legal mechanism to enforce the bargain. How 
courts address the arbitral process remains a question separate from the nature of the 
process itself, although the matters have understandably been joined, mingled and blended, 
even by the best of minds.3 
1.05 For relatively homogenous communities, the sanction for breach of an arbitration 
agreement might lie in social pressures such as shunning or refusal to do business.4  In a 
heterogeneous world, however, shame may not work.  Moreover, even close-knit groups 
often seek judicial assistance in resolving property disputes.5 Courts intervene in faith-
based arbitration for Jewish,6 Muslim,7 and Christian8 communities. 
                                                          
2 Identifying matters decided by arbitrators rather than courts remains distinct from articulating how 
arbitrators differ from judges in applying law in contract construction. The questions intersect in that legislators 
may be less inclined to enact arbitration-friendly legal regimes if they perceive arbitrators as prone to disregard 
law. Notwithstanding the oft-evoked image of ‘split-the-baby’ arbitrators, arbitrators in international matters 
may care more than judges about strict legal analysis. Particularly in the commercial realm, as creatures of 
contract arbitrators show special concern for party expectations evidenced by choice-of-law clauses, and will 
be less likely than judges to see their roles as advancing social or national policies. See William W Park, ‘The 
Predictability Paradox: Arbitrators and Applicable Law’ in Fabio Bortolotti and Pierre Mayer (eds), The 
Application of Substantive Law by International Arbitrators (Dossiers XI of the ICC Institute of World 
Business Law, 2014). For a discussion of arbitrator motivations, see Thomas Schultz and Robert Kovacs, ‘The 
Law is What the Arbitrator Ate for Breakfast’ in Julio César Betancourt (ed), Defining Issues in International 
Arbitration: Celebrating 100 Years of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (OUP 2016).  
3 See Wesley A Sturges, ‘Arbitration – What is it?’ (1960) 35 NYU L Rev 1031, 1041-45, characterising 
arbitration as a ‘litigation substitute’ so as to trigger Sunday hearing limitations.   
4 See Daniel Markovits, ‘Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and 
Contract’ (2010) 59 DePaul L Rev 431; Lisa Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of The Legal System’ (1992) 21 J Leg 
Stud 115; Jerold S Auerbach, Justice without the Law? (OUP 1983). See also Jan Paulsson, The Idea of 
Arbitration (OUP 2013) 1, speaking of ‘binding resolution of disputes accepted with serenity by those who 
bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen decision-makers’. For accounts of arbitration 
before any comprehensive legal framework on the matter see Bruce Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and 
Community in Early Connecticut (University of North Carolina Press 1987) and William W Park, ‘The 
Cohasset Marshlands Arbitration’ (Autumn 2014) ICCA Newsletter. 
5 In Baker v Fales, 16 Mass 488 (1820), the court set a framework for resolution of property disputes 
between Unitarian and Trinitarian elements in Massachusetts churches. For a more modern illustration, see 
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696 (1976). 
6 See Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] EWCA Civ 285, [1999] QB 785. In a dispute between father and son 
arising from their carpet smuggling business, the English judiciary refused to enforce an award made by a 
Jewish court, or Beth Din, which violated public policy by reason of export control violations. See also Avitzur 
v Avitzur, 58 NY 2d 108 (1983), where a pre-nuptial agreement (Ketubah) contained provisions interpreted as 
analogous to an arbitration agreement, allowing the court to compel arbitration when the husband refused to 
grant a certificate (get) allowing his wife to remarry in the Jewish faith.   
  
 
    
1.06 When one side ignores an asserted duty to arbitrate, judicial action may be sought to 
compel arbitration, to stay litigation, or to enforce awards against a loser’s assets.  In such 
instances, questions arise about what the parties agreed and whether proceedings went 
according to their expectations.9  
1.07 Although contract principles provide a starting point for analysis, any suggestion that 
arbitration remains ‘just’ a matter of contract would seem excessive. Arbitration 
agreements pave the way for something unpredictable. Third parties called arbitrators—
strangers to the agreement—make an award which replaces judicial decision-making.  
States giving effect to the process will want to monitor its legitimacy, to ensure that losers 
received due process and the arbitrator respected jurisdictional limits conferred by the 
litigants. Moreover, recognition of foreign awards can raise delicate questions of deference 
towards courts of other jurisdictions that may have vacated or confirmed the arbitrator’s 
decision.  
1.08 Arbitration statutes fill several functions.  
1.09 First, they send signals to curb judicial hostility towards perceived ‘ouster’ of judicial 
jurisdiction.10 Second, they enhance predictability in the pre-requisites for valid arbitration 
agreements and awards,11 without which practitioners would face a procedural morass 
much like the legal hodge-podge governing court selection and foreign judgments.12 
Finally, an arbitration act provides intellectual hooks on which to hang doctrines useful in 
                                                                                                                                                                               
7 In Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, [2011] 1 WLR 1872 two Muslim businessmen agreed that 
disputes arising from their hotel venture would be decided by Muslim arbitrators who were ‘respected members 
of the Ismaili community’. When one appointed a non-Muslim arbitrator, the other sought to invalidate the 
appointment. Faced with an argument that the religious requirement violated anti-discrimination law, the UK 
Supreme Court upheld the clause on the basis that arbitrators are not the parties’ employees. 
8 Spivey v Teen Challenge of Florida, 122 So 3d 986 (Fla Dist Ct App 2013), involving a wrongful death 
action on behalf of a son who overdosed after treatment at a Christian rehabilitation program. The son had 
signed an agreement for arbitration and mediation providing prayer at beginning of the hearings. The court 
enforced the clause, rejecting arguments that it violated a right to free exercise of religion. 
9 See Alan Scott Rau, ‘Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of “Consent”’ (2008) 24 Arb Int’l 199. 
10 In an early case involving an attempt at contractual circumvention of supervisory jurisdiction by the 
English courts, Scrutton J declared: ‘There must be no Alsatia in England where the King’s writ does not run’. 
Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478, 488. Alsatia referred to a part of London near Fleet Street 
that had once been a sanctuary for criminals. 
11 For a most thoughtful excursion into how the text of a statute affects decisions on arbitration, see the 
concurrence by Thomas J in AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740, 1753 (2011), addressing the 
interaction of ss 2 and 4 in the FAA. 
12 Although the New York Convention now gives international currency to arbitration awards in 156 
countries, the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 gives similar effect to decisions of national courts. See 
New York Convention, Art III. See also M/S Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 US 1, 9-12 (US 1972), noting 
that court selection clauses ‘have historically not been favored by American courts [and were often declined 
enforcement] on the ground that they were “contrary to public policy”, or that their effect was to “oust the 
jurisdiction” of the court’. 
  
 
    
addressing recurring problems. For example, the principle of ‘separability’ reduces 
prospects of arbitration being sabotaged by fraud allegations unrelated to the arbitration 
clause itself.13    
1.10 Not all arbitration laws make arbitration easier than would be the case under general 
contract principles. Although oral contracts will often be enforced, arbitration law 
generally requires ‘writing’ of some sort, sometimes augmented by signature.14 The 
requirement makes sense. It is no small matter to forego the proverbial day in court. A 
legal system that enforces waiver of recourse to judges will want to be sure that both sides 
really mean it. Of course, once a valid agreement to arbitrate has been found to exist, an 
arbitration-friendly framework reduces wiggle room for escape.15 
(c) Hard law and soft law 
1.11 Any attempt to explain the specific legal framework for arbitration requires at least a nod 
towards the question ‘what is law’ which by its vastness evokes the ‘abandon all hope’ 
warning at the door to Dante’s ‘Inferno’.  The task implicates understanding not the law of 
gravity, the law of averages, or the law of God, but rather the authoritative dispute 
resolution process elaborated through state-sponsored instruments that inform both 
substantive conduct and the way cases get decided.16 
1.12 In arbitration, such authority will often be supplemented by the ‘soft law’ in guidelines of 
professional associations and the lore of practice, representing expectations of the 
commercial community. Particularly in cross-border disputes, such norms fill gaps in 
                                                          
13 Separability permits arbitrators to do their job notwithstanding invalidity of the larger contractual 
framework, with arbitration clause remaining autonomous from the principal agreement. See William W Park, 
Arbitration of International Business Disputes (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 231-95; Alan Scott Rau, ‘Everything You 
Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions’ (2003) 14 Am Rev Int’l Arb 1; 
Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Mfg Co, 388 US 395 (1967). Some defects in the contractual framework 
do affect the arbitration clause, of course, as with forgery or duress. However, if a buyer alleges that a company 
did not have the assets represented by the seller, that dispute would raise exactly the type of question expected 
to be resolved under the acquisition agreement’s arbitration clause, notwithstanding allegations of 
misrepresentations which might ultimately lead to invalidation of the transaction.    
14 See, eg, New York Convention, Art II. cf Kahn Lucas Lancaster v Lark Int’l Ltd, 186 F 3d 210 (2d Cir 
1999) (signature needed for contract with arbitration clause) and Sphere Drake Ins v Marine Towing, 16 F 3d 
666, 669 (5th Cir 1994) (no signature needed).  
15 The notion of ‘arbitration friendly’ seems more apt than the oft-used term ‘pro-arbitration’ policy. The 
latter may be a misnomer, in that arbitration law relates to recognition of the parties’ agreement, whatever that 
might be, rather than creating an obligation to arbitrate where none existed. 
16 Francophone jurists often distinguish between ‘loi’ and ‘droit’. A tyrant’s statute (‘loi’) might be law in 
the sense of an enactment, even if contrary to authoritative norms bearing deeper legitimacy (‘droit’), not 
unlike American colonists once distinguished among laws and taxes imposed by Great Britain. 
  
 
    
national standards on evidence and ethics, addressing matters such as document 
production, witness testimony and conflicts of interest.17  
1.13 Not all scholars feel comfortable with a porous membrane between government and non-
government authorities. To count as law, some would argue, a decision-making system 
should clearly bear essential features such as public accessibility, normative coherence, 
and steadiness over time.18  
1.14 In reply to this concern, one might suggest that most human artifacts, including notions of 
law, vary depending on context.  
1.15 Tennis, squash, baseball, football and basketball all involve robust physical activity 
applied to balls. All are called games. Chess involves less physical force and no balls, yet 
still qualifies as a game.  Likewise, the contours of arbitration’s legal framework, 
particularly for international transactions, may be different from the silhouettes of fiscal or 
banking regulations.19 
1.16 General principles of arbitration law sometimes find simple application. Courts enforce 
arbitration agreements between sophisticated merchants covering the quality of grain, but 
decline to recognize awards procured by bribery or fraud. Although such clear-cut 
paradigms remain useful for analysis, they limp when applied to complex scenarios, where 
obvious answers remain elusive.  In seeking equilibrium between enforcing bargains and 
monitoring fairness, arguments may be finely balanced concerning sensitive policies, ill-
defined arbitral missions, nuanced facts, or parties with unequal bargaining power. 
                                                          
17 For an example of soft law adopted in national court decisions, see Applied Industrial Materials Corp 
(AIMCOR) v Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, 492 F 3d 132 (2d Cir 2007). Vacating an award for the 
arbitrator’s failure to investigate business contacts with one party’s affiliate, the district court made reference to 
the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest as well as the AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators. See generally 
William W Park ‘The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration’ in Loukas Mistelis and Julian D M 
Lew (eds), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2006) 141. Sources of 
‘soft law’ include not only the IBA and AAA pronouncements on ethics, but also guidelines from those bodies 
on evidence and information exchange, as well as UNIDROIT contract principles, and the LCIA Rules Annex 
on professional conduct. 
18 In particular, see Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality: Stateless Law and International Arbitration  
(OUP 2014) 18–19 and Thomas Schultz, ‘The Concept of Law in Transnational Arbitral Legal Orders’ (2011) 
2 JIDS 59, taking aim at the ‘École de Dijon’ which during the last century introduced into arbitration notions 
such as ‘transnational law’ and lex mercatoria. 
19 For a survey of law from a wider perspective, see Robert P George, ‘What is Law? A Century of 
Arguments’ (2001) First Things 23, taking as a springboard the ‘bad man theory’ of Oliver Wendell Holmes 
presented in a lecture at Boston University, arguing that the best characterisation of law would be prediction of 
what brings the sanction feared by a bad man. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 
Harv L Rev 457. For an exploration of divisions between domestic and international law, see Jack Goldsmith 




    
B. From General to Specific 
(a) A New Zealand vignette  
1.17 A recent decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court illustrates how challenges to 
arbitration agreements can trigger rival goals, each of which might be extended but for the 
existence of others.20 After cancellation of an agreement for sale of farming and hotel 
assets, the disappointed party blamed its lawyers for mishandling the transaction. When the 
malpractice claims were arbitrated, both sides participated without complaint. The lawyers 
prevailed because of the client’s inability to prove that attorney negligence caused the deal 
to fail. The losing side then moved to appeal, or alternatively to have the award set aside. 
1.18 The arbitration agreement provided that the award might be challenged on ‘questions of 
law and fact’, a provision the court considered an impermissible expansion of relevant law.  
The New Zealand Arbitration Act permits appeal only for error of law, not mistake of 
fact.21 The valid and invalid provisions were deemed incapable of being severed, and the 
award was set aside. All bets were off, since the parties did not get what they expected, 
which for the loser included a chance to re-argue the facts of the case.22 
1.19 This New Zealand case raised questions similar to those in a leading American decision, 
but with different results.  The US Supreme Court held that federal law precludes appeal 
on the merits of an arbitrator’s determination, no matter what the parties agreed.23 In this 
respect, the American and New Zealand approaches converge. In the American case, 
however, the arbitrator’s award was left standing, whereas the New Zealand award was 
annulled because valid and invalid elements of the agreement intertwined to thwart the 
parties’ expectations. 
1.20 The irony of the New Zealand decision will not escape thoughtful observers. Legislators 
sought to enhance arbitral finality by precluding appeal on questions of fact. In the end, 
however, the statute led to an award without consequences. 
                                                          
20 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan [2014] NZSC 75 (Sup Ct New Zealand 2014). See note by John Walton, 
‘The Supreme Court in Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan’ (2014) NZLJ 244, calling the case ‘a disappointing 
outcome, but an object lesson all the same.’ 
21 For domestic arbitration, appeal is allowed absent an agreement otherwise, while for international 
arbitration the parties must opt into an appellate regime. In either case appeal is allowed for ‘incorrect 
interpretation of the applicable law’ but not on whether the arbitrators drew correct inferences from relevant 
facts. New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, sch 2, Art 5(10). 
22 The New Zealand Supreme Court found that the parties’ agreed scope of appeal went ‘to the heart of their agreement’ to submit the 
dispute to arbitration. Carr (n 20) [70] (McGrath J). 
23 Hall Street Associates v Mattel, Inc, 552 US 576 (2008). See also Kyocera Corp v Prudential-Bache 
Trade Services, 341 F 3d 987 (9th Cir 2003). 
  
 
    
(b) The ‘procedural fairness’ model of arbitration 
1.21 The New Zealand decision serves as a springboard from which to consider several themes 
in modern arbitration law. Most major business centers have abandoned hostility to 
arbitration, and have restricted appeal on the legal and factual merits of a case. Any rights 
of appeal can usually be waived by the parties. On the assumption that an arbitral award 
should be the end rather than beginning of litigation, the emerging trend grants deference 
to arbitrators’ decisions,24 while retaining mandatory judicial review only for defects 
related to jurisdiction, due process and public policy.25 This ‘procedural fairness’ model 
resonates with arbitration’s treaty architecture, which gives awards an international 
currency subject to safeguards related to public policy and respect for the limits of arbitral 
authority.26   
1.22 In some countries, notably England, the path to the ‘procedural fairness’ paradigm has 
been well documented.  At one time, English law permitted de facto appeal through a 
procedure requiring arbitrators to ‘state the case’ for court determination. On the 
assumption that the commercial community had little interest in judges second-guessing 
arbitrators’ decisions, the law in 1979 moved to a model in which courts no longer 
controlled the legal exactness of an award.27 En route to the current statutory regime, 
amended again in 1996, the law flirted with a halfway house of merits appeal in maritime, 
insurance and commodities cases, where arbitration was deemed of special value in 
fertilising development of substantive legal principles.28  
                                                          
24 Where appeal on points of law exists, it will usually derive from the parties’ opting in (or failure to opt 
out) or through special regimes to protect consumers and employees against ill-informed choices. 
25 Notable jurisdictions include Belgium, England, France, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the US, as well as countries that have adopted some form of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model 
Law such as Australia, Bermuda, Canada and Germany. See William W Park, ‘Jurisdiction to Determine 
Jurisdiction’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? (ICCA Congress 
Series No 13, Kluwer Law International 2007) 55. 
26 New York Convention, Art V; ICSID Convention, Arts 52 and 53. 
27 William W Park, ‘Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English 
Arbitration Act of 1979’ (1980) 21 Harv Int’l LJ 87; William W Park, ‘The Interaction of Courts and 
Arbitrators in England’ (1998) 1 Int ALR 54. Julian D M Lew and others (eds), Arbitration in England: with 
Chapters on Scotland and Ireland (Kluwer Law International 2013). 
28 Appeal on questions of English law exists only if not ‘otherwise agreed’, with such opt-out allowed by 
reference to institutional rules. Challenge to awards as of right exists only for defects related to ‘substantive 
jurisdiction’ and ‘serious irregularity’. English Arbitration Act 1996, ss 67-69. 
  
 
    
1.23 Even with arbitration-friendly paradigms, some grounds for challenge remain difficult to 
define with intellectual rigor.29 In particular, no easy method exists to trace the line 
between excess of authority and an arbitrator’s simple mistake, the latter normally being a 
risk assumed when parties agree to arbitrate.30      
1.24 When law diverges from country to country, the disparity often derives not from discord 
on policy goals, but by reason of the relative weight given to rival risks. French courts 
generally delay judicial review of an arbitrator’s jurisdiction until an award has been made, 
to reduce prospects for sabotage by dilatory challenges.31 In comparison, American courts 
may assess the validity of an arbitration agreement at any moment, to avoid expensive 
proceedings that ultimately prove futile.32 
(c) Annulled awards: convergence and conflict   
1.25 The effect of award annulment remains an enduring source of divergence among legal 
systems in their assessment of optimum counterpoise among finality, efficiency and 
fairness in arbitration.33 If a Swiss court sets aside an award made in Geneva, should the 
award be enforceable in Paris or London? To what extent does annulment at the seat of 
proceedings eliminate or restrict the award’s effect in other countries? These questions 
overlap with, but remain distinct from, the debate on proper grounds for the setting aside at 
the arbitral seat. 
                                                          
29 The English judge Lord Denning once suggested (albeit in an administrative context) that going wrong 
in law meant exceeding authority, since a tribunal was not authorized to decide in error. See Lord Denning, The 
Discipline of the Law (OUP 1979) 74. This position was rejected by the House of Lords in 2005 in the Lesotho 
Highlands decision, see Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA [2006] 1 AC 221. 
30 In some instances, challenge may be heard on hybrid grounds such as ‘manifest disregard of the law’, 
which falls shy of full appeal, albeit constituting something more than simple excess of authority. See Stolt-
Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 559 US 662, 671 (2010). See also ‘manifest excess of powers’ in ICSID 
Convention Art 52(1)(b). 
31 See French CPC, Arts 1448 and 1506. 
32 See Three Valleys Municipal Water District v EF Hutton, 925 F 2d 1136 (9th Cir 1991); Sandvik AB v 
Advent International Corp, 220 F 3d 99 (3rd Cir 2000).   
33 For a discussion, see Alex Mills, ‘The Principled English Ambivalence To Law and Dispute Resolution 
Beyond the State’ in Julio César Betancourt (ed), Defining Issues in International Arbitration: Celebrating 100 
Years of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (OUP 2016).  
  
 
    
1.26 French courts take a clear position, showing little difficulty giving effect to awards set 
aside where rendered.  On receiving confirmation (exequatur), an award enters the French 
legal order with a res iudicata effect that trumps the effect of annulment by the curial 
courts at the seat of proceedings.34   
1.27 Some scholars justify such recognition of annulled awards by reference to a free-floating 
international legal order.35 Others remain sceptical.36 Each side of the debate can invoke 
the rhetoric of regard for the parties’ agreement. If litigants bargain to arbitrate, says one 
side, why defer to a judicial annulment?  In reply, the other side can note that most 
arbitration clauses specify a geographical venue, thus implying expectation of judicial 
control at the arbitral seat.37 
1.28 A middle position suggests that sound policy treats annulment decisions like other foreign 
country money judgments, respected unless reason exists to see the vacating judgment as 
lacking procedural integrity.38 Initially suggested in an American law review article,39 this 
intermediate view has gained traction in recent case law and scholarship.40 
                                                          
34 Société Hilmarton Ltd v Société OTV, Cass 1e civ, 23 March 1994, 1994 Rev arb 327, note Charles 
Jarrosson; PT Putrabali Adyamulia Rena Holding Ltd, Cass 1e civ, 29 June 2007, 2007 Rev arb 507, note E 
Gaillard. See commentary by Philippe Pinsolle, ‘The Status of Vacated Awards in France’ (2008) 24 Arb Int’l 
277; Richard Hulbert, ‘When the Theory Doesn’t Fit the Facts A Further Comment on Putrabali’ (2009) 25 Arb 
Int’l 157. 
35 Emmanuel Gaillard, Aspects philosophiques du droit de l’arbitrage international (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008), adapted as Legal Theory of International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010). cf 
Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding Local Standard Annulment’ (1998) 9 (No 1) ICC 
Int’l Ct Arb Bull 14. 
36 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia’ (2010) 27(2) J Int’l 
Arb 189; and Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Should Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award be Abolished?’ (2014) 
ICSID Rev 1. 
37 Analogous issues arise for awards confirmed at the arbitral seat but challenged abroad. See 
Commissions Imp Exp SA v Republic of Congo, 2014 WL 3377337 (DC Cir 2014). A Paris award confirmed in 
England was subsequently presented for enforcement under the District of Columbia Money Judgments 
Recognition Act. Reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals held that the FAA does not preempt the 
longer limitations period in the Judgments Act. See also Island Territory of Curacao v Solitron Devices, Inc, 
489 F 2d 1313 (2d Cir 1973). cf Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. 
38 For an illustration of questionable annulment see Telecordia Tech v Telkom SA, 458 F 3d 172 (3d Cir 
2006). An ICC award made in South Africa was vacated by a judge who instead of letting the ICC name a new 
arbitrator, constituted a replacement tribunal composed of three retired South African judges nominated by the 
losing South African side. 
39 William W Park, ‘Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration’ (1999) 93 AJIL 805. 
40 See discussion below of the Yukos and Pemex decisions. See ALI, Restatement (Third) US Law of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Tentative Draft No 2 (2012) ss 4-16, comment c: ‘Though courts in the 
US ordinarily decline to recognize and enforce awards that have been set aside by a court having proper 
jurisdiction, the Restatement acknowledges that under the New York Convention and the Panama Convention, 
a court may in certain exceptional situations confirm, recognize, or enforce an award that has been set aside’. 
  
 
    
1.29 Dutch and British courts have adopted this more nuanced view in recent cases arising from 
the much-publicised Yukos saga.41 An Amsterdam court confirmed awards made in 
Moscow that had been vacated by Russian courts, reasoning that foreign annulments 
should be respected only if they meet minimal criteria for procedural due process.42  
Likewise, the English High Court ruled that annulment at the seat of arbitration does not 
automatically foreclose enforceability abroad under what the Court called an ex nihilo nil 
fit principle. It would be quite unsatisfactory to give effect to judgments that offended 
basic ‘honesty, natural justice and domestic concepts of public policy’.43 
1.30 American case law has evolved in a similar direction, respecting annulment except upon a 
showing of irregularity by the vacating court.  In 2007, a federal court refused enforcement 
of an award made in Colombia that had been vacated because local law did not permit 
arbitration under the ICC Arbitration Rules.44 Six years later, however, a federal court 
confirmed a Mexican award notwithstanding annulment in Mexico, reasoning that ex post 
application of Mexican procedural law violated basic notions of due process.45 
C. Two Case Studies 
1.31 The legitimacy of arbitration raises a range of questions touching everything from Sunday 
hearings46 to waiver of arbitrator bias,47 stopping along the way at two matters that 
                                                          
41 The Russian energy giant Yukos, once controlled by oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was declared 
bankrupt after a tax investigation resulting in its owner being eliminated as a political opponent of Vladimir 
Putin. In bankruptcy proceedings, Rosneft, an entity controlled by the Russian state, acquired the majority of 
Yukos’ assets, giving rise to multiple arbitrations. The saga drew public attention in July 2014 when awards 
were issued in three Energy Charter Treaty arbitrations brought against the Russian Federation for which the 
PCA served as Registry. See Stanley Reed, ‘Yukos Shareholders Awarded About $50 Billion in Court Ruling’ 
NY Times, Int’l Business (28 July 2014).  
42 Yukos Capital SARL v OAO Rosneft, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam (Enterprise Division), 28 April 
2009, LJN BI2451 s 3.10, refusing to recognise the Russian annulment. See Lisa Bench Nieuwveld, ‘Yukos v 
Rosneft: The Dutch Courts find that Exceptional 27 Circumstances Exist’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 11 
February 2010) <www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com>. 
43 Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm) (Simon J). An earlier 
English decision, Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co [2012] EWCA Civ 855 (Rix, Longmore and 
Davis LJJ) held that Rosneft (the Russian controlled entity) was not estopped from objecting to award 
enforcement in England since public policy issues (the fairness of the Russian annulments) might be decided 
differently from country to country. 
44 Termorio SA ESP v Electranta SP, 487 F 3d 928 (DC Cir 2007), which sounded the death knell of an 
earlier decision (Chromalloy v Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F Supp 907, DDC 1996) enforcing an award made 
in Cairo but set aside by an Egyptian court. 
45 Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S de RL de CV v Pemex-Exploracion y Produccion, 
962 F Supp 2d 642 (SDNY 2013), arising from an award made in Mexico in favour of a Mexican subsidiary of 
a US construction company against a state-owned Mexican petroleum entity.   
46 In Bauer v Bauer (No 507082/2013, NY Sup Ct 2014), an inheritance dispute was decided by a Beth 
Din after sitting on Sunday. At the request of the losing side, a Brooklyn judge annulled the award on the basis 
that arbitrators perform a judicial function and thus must respect s 5 of the New York Judiciary Law, which 
says that courts may not be open on Sunday. For a similar case decided earlier, but coming to a different result, 
see Karapschinsky v Rothbaum, 163 SW 290 (Mo Ct App 1914).   
  
 
    
persistently vex courts and commentators: (i) allocating tasks between judges and 
arbitrators and (ii) determining what law applies to an arbitration clause.  These questions 
were addressed recently in the well-publicized American and British cases discussed 
below. 
(a) Who decides what?  
1.32 In BG Group PLC v Argentina, the US Supreme Court reviewed an award arising from gas 
distribution in Buenos Aires.48 Argentine emergency measures had ‘pesified’ tariffs by 
converting dollar-denominated rates into pesos at a third the original value. An 
UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal sitting in Washington awarded a British investor US$185 
million for violation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in the UK-Argentine 
investment treaty, which allowed arbitration by an investor, but only eighteen months after 
submitting the dispute to host country courts. Notwithstanding failure to respect the 
eighteen-month rule, the arbitral tribunal took jurisdiction, reasoning that the emergency 
decrees restricted access to the judiciary so as to preclude a literal reading of that 
provision.    
1.33 The award was challenged for excess of authority under the FAA.49 A majority opinion by 
the US Supreme Court applied what it described as ordinary contract principles to require 
deference to the arbitrators’ determination of the conditions at issue in the case. The 
eighteen-month rule was characterized as a purely procedural matter in the nature of a 
claims-processing rule governing when the arbitration may begin, not whether it may occur 
at all. 
1.34 A dissent by Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that jurisdictional challenges bear an added 
layer of complexity for investment treaties and free trade agreements. Each state extends a 
standing offer to arbitrate which the investor must accept on terms stipulated by the host 
country. Until acceptance of the offer, no agreement to arbitrate exists, since the investor 
was not party to the treaty.50 It thus falls to courts to decide whether the offer was 
                                                                                                                                                                               
47 Schwartzman v Harlap, 377 Fed Appx 108 (2d Cir NY 2010). 
48 134 S Ct 1198 (2014). See Larry Shore and Amal Bouchenaki, ‘Note’ (2012) Cahiers Arb 675; Brief 
for Professors and Practitioners as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, BG Group PLC v Argentina (No 12-
138). 
49 A different result might be obtained in arbitration conducted under the ICSID Rules, which enhance 
award finality by precluding challenge under the law of the arbitral seat, instead providing for consideration of 
by an ad hoc committee convened by ICSID. See ICSID Convention, Arts 52 and 54, the latter providing for 
award recognition in the same way as a judgment of the state where relied upon. 
50 For investment treaty arbitration, it might be possible that the contracting nations agree that alleged 
jurisdictional flaws be evaluated by some third body, whether a tribunal seized of the claim or an institution 
supervising the proceedings as happens in ad hoc review pursuant to Art 52 of the ICSID Convention. Whether 
such designation happens will depend on the facts of each case.    
  
 
    
accepted, which in the instant case required consideration of whether a litigation attempt 
would have been futile.51 
1.35 Arguments can certainly be made for an arbitrator’s right to determine questions properly 
characterized as matters of ripeness, recevabilité or admissibility, which may be cured 
during the arbitration. Much depends on the relevant arbitration provision. One treaty 
might say that arbitration claims may be filed ‘only a year after a local court action has 
been commenced,’ while another might say arbitration can begin ‘provided that if a court 
action has been filed the courts shall be given a year to resolve the matter.’ 
1.36 Whether pursuant to contract or treaty, some procedural steps remain essential to contract 
formation, and as such constitute preconditions to arbitral authority, while others do not.52  
Likewise, arbitrators possess discretion on some procedural matters, but not others.53 
Sound analysis requires attention to the facts of each case, along with the language and 
structure of the contract or treaty allegedly creating arbitral authority. Dispute resolution 
will be ill-served if judges and lawyers simply incant catchphrases about procedural 
conditions.   
(b) What law applies? 
1.37 On occasion, the law governing an agreement to arbitrate may differ from the legal 
principles applicable to other aspects of the parties’ commercial relationship. SulAmérica v 
Enesa Engenheria involved claims under two insurance policies relating to construction of 
a hydro-electric plant in Brazil. English courts were asked to restrain litigation in Brazil.54   
1.38 At first blush, applicability of English law seems odd. The contracts were concluded 
among Brazilian companies, with express choice of Brazilian law and exclusive 
jurisdiction given to Brazilian courts. Recourse to the law of England becomes more 
plausible, however, given the parties’ agreement to arbitrate in London. The insurers 
commenced arbitration in order to contest liability, whereas the insured began a court 
                                                          
51 In this connection, the concurring opinion of Sotomayor J urged that close attention be paid to 
expressions of intent as articulated by the treaty partners: ‘if the local litigation requirement at issue here were 
labeled a condition on the treaty parties’ consent to arbitrate, that would […] change the analysis as to whether 
the parties intended the requirement to be interpreted by a court or an arbitrator’. BG Group (n 48) 1214. 
52 If a house painting contract is offered on condition that the contractor post a bond, the painter cannot 
say that the contract’s arbitration clause became effective although the bond was rejected. By contrast, if the 
contract provided for painting the second floor after payment for the first floor, a dispute about whether the first 
floor had been painted would fall to the arbitrator. See argument by counsel for Argentina, Oral Argument 
Transcript 2 December 2013, 51-52. 
53 If an adequate advance on cost must be deposited before proceedings begin, arbitrators would normally 
be the ones to decide what amount will be sufficient. By contrast, if the contract or treaty requires arbitration in 
Washington pursuant to the UNCITRAL, it would be a brave judge indeed who would defer to an arbitrator’s 
decision to hear proceedings in Paris under the ICC Arbitration Rules, absent some special circumstance or 
further agreement by the parties. 
54 SulAmérica Cia Nacional De Seguros SA v Enesa Engenheria SA [2012] EWCA Civ 638. 
  
 
    
action in Brazil. In considering whether to enjoin the Brazilian litigation, the English court 
had to decide what law governed the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.55  
1.39 The court reasoned that an arbitration clause might be subject to a law different from that 
of the substantive contract. The parties had not expressly chosen a law to govern the 
arbitration clause itself. Rejecting an implied choice of Brazilian law, the court found the 
law of England, as the seat of the arbitration, to have the most real connection with the 
question presented, and upheld the anti-suit injunction restraining the litigation. 
1.40 Not all choice-of-law questions will be answered in favour of the arbitral seat. In one 
American case, a boat owner brought an action against a salvage company seeking 
indemnity or contribution for damages to a coral reef.56 The court denied the salvage 
company’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that US federal law, not English law as 
provided in the contract, applied to determine whether parties had agreed to arbitrate.     
D. Shifting Images of Arbitration   
1.41 One challenge in explaining arbitration law lies in the dramatically divergent images 
evoked by arbitration. All may be correct, yet inadequate—in a way reminiscent of the 
Hindu parable of blind men who experience an elephant differently depending on the parts 
being touched:  a wall (the side), a snake (the trunk), a tree (the knee) a fan (the ear) or a 
rope (the tail).57 
1.42 Arbitrators determine billion dollar international investment claims. In some countries, 
they also hear claims related to student loans, credit card debt, consumer sales and 
employment discrimination. Arbitrators address disputes arising from construction 
projects, baseball salaries, biotech licenses, uncompensated expropriation, automobile 
franchises, liability insurance and Internet domain names.  
1.43 Not surprisingly, the values that commend arbitration in transactions concluded by 
sophisticated business managers may seem ill placed when an arbitral clause sends poorly-
informed consumers to seek an uncertain remedy in an inaccessible venue. In consequence, 
scholarly and judicial debate on arbitration often resemble the proverbial ships passing in 
the night, with different camps clinging to contrasting notions of what remains at stake. 
                                                          
55 The notion of one proper law to govern an agreement’s material validity, scope and interpretation has 
deep roots in English legal thinking.  With respect to arbitration agreements, the relevant principles have often 
been summarised through reference to r 57 of the Dicey, Morris and Collins treatise on Conflicts of Law. For 
an exploration of the limits of this approach, see William W Park, ‘Rules and Standards in Private International 
Law, Review Essay of Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws (Sir Lawrence Collins, 14th edn)’ 
(2007) 73 Arbitration 441. 
56 Cape Flattery Ltd v Titan Maritime, 647 F 3d 914 (9th Cir 2011). The contract provided that ‘Any 
dispute arising under this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration in London, England, in accordance with the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 and any amendments thereto, English law’. The clause was interpreted to cover 
only disputes relating to interpretation and performance of the agreement itself. 
57 The poem by John Godfrey Saxe, ‘The Blind Men and the Elephant’, ends with the line, ‘Though each 
was partly in the right, And all were in the wrong!’ 
  
 
    
1.44 In a sense, arbitration has become a victim of its own success, with new frontiers creating 
new criticism.58 Disputes decided by arbitration run far beyond traditional stomping 
grounds of shipping, insurance, and merchant-to-merchant sales. Arbitrators address patent 
validity, Olympic events59 and income tax allocations.60 In the US, with its distinctive 
legislative tradition,61 arbitration can involve class actions,62 sports doping,63 beauty 
pageants,64 and trade unions grievances, the last being an outgrowth of labour’s distrust of 
judges.65  
                                                          
58 See William W Park, ‘Arbitration’s Discontents’ in Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Bernard 
Audit (LGDJ 2014). One recent book carries a dedication page, ‘For the Millions of Americans Unjustly Bound 
by an Arbitration Agreement’. See Imre Szalai, Outsourcing Justice: The Rise of Modern Arbitration Laws in 
America (CAP 2013), which started with a story about arbitration over rape in Baghdad. Compare a less 
sensationalised treatment of the subject in Ian R Macneil, American Arbitration Law (OUP 1992). 
59 Antonio Rigozzi, L’arbitrage international en matière de sport (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2005); 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration at the Olympics (Kluwer Law International 2001). 
60 William W Park and David R Tillinghast, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (Sdu Fiscale & Financiele 
Uitgevers 2004); William W Park, ‘Arbitrability and Tax’ in Loukas Mistelis and Stavros Brekoulakis (eds), 
Arbitrability 179 (Kluwer Law International 2008); Marcus Desax and Marc Veit, ‘Arbitration of Tax Treaty 
Disputes: The OECD Proposal’ (2007) 23 Arb Int’l 405. 
61 See Christopher Drahozal, ‘In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the 
Federal Arbitration Act’ (2002) 78 Notre Dame L Rev 101. 
62 See, eg, American Express Co v Italian Colors Rest, 133 S Ct 2304, 2309 (2013); Laurence Tribe and 
Joshua Matz, The Roberts Court and the Constitution (2014) 291-99; William W Park, ‘La jurisprudence 
américaine en matière de “class arbitration”:  entre débat politique et technique juridique’ (2012) Rev arb 507. 
63 On 5 August 2013 Major League baseball announced the 211 game suspension of New York Yankees 
player Alex Rodriguez for use of steroids. The Uniform Player’s Contract signed by major league players 
contains a grievance procedure which includes an agreement to arbitrate. 
64 Miss Universe LP v Monnin, 952 F Supp 2d 591 (SDNY 2013). A disappointed Miss Pennsylvania, 
failing to reach the finals and losing to Miss Rhode Island, charged the pageant was rigged. 
65 Concern about judicial hostility to trade unions led to arbitration of collective bargaining agreements in 
the US, albeit on a statutory foundation separate from that of the FAA. See Taft-Hartley Labor-Management 
Relations Act, s 301, 29 USC s 185 (2003). 
  
 
    
1.45 Notwithstanding its diversity and chameleon-like character, in all its forms the core of 
arbitration involves renunciation of otherwise competent courts in favour of a binding 
private adjudication. Such renunciation may be explained by a multitude of narratives.66 In 
international disputes, arbitration enhances more level playing fields. In construction and 
insurance, the goal might be expertise. In the US, arbitration removes disputes from the 
perceived vagaries of civil juries.   
1.46 Inevitably, conclusions about why people arbitrate bear on how the law develops. In a case 
involving consumer cellphone contracts, the US Supreme Court struck down, as 
inconsistent with the purposes of arbitration, a California rule that had invalidated waivers 
of class arbitration. The rule was deemed to run afoul of the goals of arbitration, a conflict 
summarised as follows: ‘class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration 
—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment’.67 
1.47 Careful thinkers may scratch their heads at the assertion that informality constitutes 
arbitration’s ‘principal advantage’ in an era when arbitration routinely serves to decide 
complex international investment cases which often unfold like judicial proceedings. A 
more sensible summary might be taken from language in an earlier Supreme Court case, 
which spoke of arbitration as a process to avoid ‘unseemly and mutually destructive 
jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages.’68   
E. Conclusion 
1.48 One Nobel Prize winner suggested that understanding a subject means reducing it to a 
‘freshman level’ of simplicity.69 Such  plain speaking will have obvious limits, of course. 
The best-chosen words connect themselves sequentially through human grammar, while 
the reality of legal doctrine implicates a multitude of caveats and exceptions that remain 
obstinately simultaneous in nature. 
                                                          
66 Even within a single field, such as investor-state arbitration, conflicting models present themselves. See 
Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System’ (2013) 
107 AJIL 45; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘At the Edge of Chaos: Foreign Investment Law as a Complex Adaptive System’ 
(2014) 29 ICSID Rev 372; Charles N Brower, ‘Investomercial Arbitration’ (2014) 80 Arbitration 179. cf Gus 
van Harten, ‘Investment Arbitrators’ Evident Lack of Restraint’ (2014) 5 JIDS 1. 
67 AT & T Mobility v Concepcion, 131 S Ct (2011), 1751-53 (Scalia J). 
68 Scherk v Alberto-Culver, 417 US 506 (1974), echoed in a later case deciding that the New York 
Convention trumped the US Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay of arbitration. See Sonatrach v Distrigas Corp, 
80 BR 606 (D Mass 1987), where Judge Young concluded, ‘It is important and necessary for the United States 
to hold its domiciliaries to their bargains and not allow them to escape their commercial obligations by ducking 
into statutory safe harbors’. 
69 Attributed to Richard Feynman, winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize for Physics, who in his day combined 
academic recognition with an eccentric persona that created a wide public following. 
  
 
    
1.49 Hemmed by this caution, a tentative explanation of arbitration law suggests tension 
between two sets of expectations. First, courts should give effect to arbitration 
commitments obtained through informed consent. Second, judges must monitor 
arbitration’s basic procedural integrity, which includes impartial arbitrators who hear 
before deciding and respect both contractual limits of their authority and relevant public 
policy. The role of arbitration law thus aims to enhance the rule of law in its broadest 
sense, seeking balance between respect for parties’ agreement and the correlative judicial 
duty to monitor fairness in the process.  Thus conceived, arbitration law will serve to 
promote the type of economic cooperation enhanced by reliable vindication of ex ante 
expectations. 
 
